This volume contains a clear and accurate translation of the last two books of Aristotle's Politics, together with a philosophical commentary. It is well suited to the requirements of students, including those who do not know Greek. The Politics is a key document in Western political thought; it raises and discusses many theoretical and practical political issues which are still debated today. In Books VII and VIII Aristotle gives his fullest picture of the ideal civic community, as a (...) model for actual political systems. (shrink)

This is a clear, accurate translation of the last two books of Aristotle's Politics, together with a philosophical commentary, ideally suited to students, especially those who do not know Greek.

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, which equates the ultimate end of human life with happiness, is thought by many readers to argue that this highest goal consists in the largest possible aggregate of intrinsic goods. Richard Kraut proposes instead that Aristotle identifies happiness with only one type of good: excellent activity of the rational soul. In defense of this reading, Kraut discusses Aristotle's attempt to organize all human goods into a single structure, so that each subordinate (...) end is desirable for the sake of some higher goal. This book also emphasizes the philosopher's hierarchy of natural kinds, in which every type of creature achieves its good by imitating divine life. As Kraut argues, Aristotle's belief that thinking is the sole activity of the gods leads him to an intellectualist conception of the ethical virtues. Aristotle values these traits because, by subordinating emotion to reason, they enhance our ability to lead a life devoted to philosophy or politics. (shrink)

This volume contains a clear and accurate translation of the last two books of Aristotle's Politics, together with a philosophical commentary. It is well suited to the requirements of students, including those who do not know Greek. The Politics is a key document in Western political thought; it raises and discusses many theoretical and practical political issues which are still debated today. In Books VII and VIII Aristotle gives his fullest picture of the ideal civic community, as a (...) model for actual political systems. (shrink)

Aristotle conceives of ethical theory as a field distinct from the theoretical sciences. Its methodology must match its subject matter—good action—and must respect the fact that in this field many generalizations hold only for the most part. We study ethics in order to improve our lives, and therefore its principal concern is the nature of human well-being. Aristotle follows Socrates and Plato in taking the virtues to be central to a well-lived life. Like Plato, he regards the ethical (...) virtues (justice, courage, temperance and so on) as complex rational, emotional and social skills. But he rejects Plato's idea that a training in the sciences and metaphysics is a necessary prerequisite for a full understanding of our good. What we need, in order to live well, is a proper appreciation of the way in which such goods as friendship, pleasure, virtue, honor and wealth fit together as a whole. In order to apply that general understanding to particular cases, we must acquire, through proper upbringing and habits, the ability to see, on each occasion, which course of action is best supported by reasons. Therefore practical wisdom, as he conceives it, cannot be acquired solely by learning general rules. We must also acquire, through practice, those deliberative, emotional, and social skills that enable us to put our general understanding of well-being into practice in ways that are suitable to each occasion. (shrink)

This book offers a systematic overview of Aristotle's conception of well-being, virtue and justice in the Nicomachean Ethics, and then explores the major themes of Politics: civic-mindedness, slavery, family, property, the common good, class conflict, the limited wisdom of the multitude, and the radically egalitarian institutions of the ideal society.

Richard Kraut presents a new theory of human well-being. Kraut's principal idea, Aristotelian in spirit, is that 'external goods' have at most an indirect bearing on the quality of our lives. A good internal life - one with quality emotional, intellectual, social, and perceptual experiences - is what well-being consists in.

I argue that the many similarities between what aristotle says about "eudaimonia" and what we say about happiness justify the traditional translation of "eudaimonia" as "happiness." it is not widely realized that "eudaimonia" involves a psychological state much like the one we call "happiness." nor is it generally recognized that both "eudaimonia" and "happiness" involve a standard for evaluating lives. For aristotle, The standard is objective and inflexible; for us, It is subjective and flexible. Thus, When we call (...) someone happy and aristotle says he is not "eudaimon", We are not using two different concepts, But rather two different ways of evaluating lives. (shrink)

_The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics_ illuminates Aristotle’s ethics for both academics and students new to the work, with sixteen newly commissioned essays by distinguished international scholars. The structure of the book mirrors the organization of the Nichomachean Ethics itself. Discusses the human good, the general nature of virtue, the distinctive characteristics of particular virtues, voluntariness, self-control, and pleasure.

When we compare contemporary moral philosophy with the well-known moral systems of earlier centuries, we should be struck by the fact that a certain assumption about human well being that is now widely taken for granted was universally rejected in the past. The contemporary moral climate predisposes us to be pluralistic about the human good, whereas earlier systems of ethics embraced a conception of well being that we would now call narrow and restrictive. One way to convey the sort of (...) contrast I have in mind is to note that according to Plato and Aristotle, there is one kind of life, that of the philosopher, that represents the summit of human flourishing, and all other lives are worth leading to the extent that they approximate this ideal. Certain other ethical theories of the past were in a way more narrow than this, for whereas Plato and Aristotle maintained that many things are in themselves worthwhile, others argued that there is only one intrinsic good—pleasure according to the Epicureans, virtue according to the Stoics. By contrast, it is now widely assumed that all such approaches are too exclusive, that not only are there many types of intrinsic goods but there is no one specific kind of life—whether it is that of a philosopher or a poet or anyone else—that is the single human ideal. Even hedonism, a conception of the good that had a powerful influence in the modern period, has few contemporary proponents. A consensus has arisen in our time that there is no single ultimate good that provides the measure by which the worth of all other goods must be assessed. (shrink)

This book is a concise, lucid and helpful discussion of some themes that Anthony Kenny has been exploring for many years. He published an excellent essay, one still worth reading, about Aristotle on eudaimonia in the 1965–66 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Then in 1978, he created a sensation with The Aristotelian Ethics, in which he challenged the widespread assumption of the philosophical and scholarly world that the Nicomachean Ethics is a much improved revision of the Eudemian Ethics, and (...) that the latter need be read only by specialists. That book was principally devoted to historical and stylometric matters, Although in two chapters he discussed the treatment of wisdom and happiness in the books shared by the NE and the EE. Aristotle’s Theory of the Will pursued further philosophical comparisons between the two treatises, focusing on Aristotle’s views about voluntariness, choice and practical reasoning. (shrink)

Before going any further, something should be said about the word "natural" that appears in my title. Miller distinguishes two ways in which rights can be called natural, and holds that Aristotle recognizes natural rights in one sense but not the other. First, "natural" can be contrasted with "conventional," "legal," and "customary." This is the familiar distinction the Greeks made between physis and nomos. Aristotle makes use of the distinction when he contrasts natural and legal justice. According to (...) Miller, Aristotle has a theory of natural rights in the sense that he has a theory of natural justice that serves as the basis for his recognition of rights. It is naturally and not merely legally just that certain people be treated in certain ways; they have a valid claim, based on natural justice, to such treatment, and this claim is valid whether or not it is recognized by a legal system. On the other hand, the term "natural right" can also be used in a second way, to designate a right that is possessed in a state of nature, that is, at a time prior to the existence of political communities. Miller holds that Aristotle does not recognize natural rights of this sort, but as he points out, this would not prevent Aristotle from recognizing natural rights in the first sense. The natural rights Miller finds in Aristotle are not possessed by all people at all times; rather, his thesis is that when the polis does come into existence, Aristotelian natural justice requires that political systems be structured in ways that recognize the rights of certain human beings. More specifically, when the polis arises, certain people have a natural right to hold various political offices and to own property. (shrink)

The prelims comprise: The Nature of Aristotelian Justification The Endoxa Finding and Explaining Errors Can there be Proof in Ethics? Foundationalism The Test of Experience Is Aristotle's Method too Conservative? “Brought up Well” Notes References Further reading.

The passage I will discuss in this paper, one of the best known in the Aristotelian corpus, occurs in Book I chapter 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, and concerns the ergon, i.e. the function, of human beings. Aristotle argues that we have a function, that our happiness consists in fulfilling it, and that this function must be idion, i.e. it must be peculiar to us. On this basis, he asserts that our function cannot consist in being alive, nourishment, growth, (...) or perception, for these activities are common to other species. Aristotle then arrives at his familiar conclusion that our function consists in the excellent use of reason. (shrink)

Aristotle's doctrine that human beings are political animals is, in part, an empirical thesis, and posits an inclination to enter into cooperative relationships, even apart from the instrumental benefits of doing so. Aristotle's insight is that human cooperation rests on a non-rational propensity to trust even strangers, when conditions are favorable. Turning to broader questions about the role of nature in human development, I situate Aristotle's attitude towards our natural propensities between two extremes: he rejects both the (...) view that we must bow to whatever nature dictates, and also the view that nature is generally or always to be suppressed or overcome. This middle position requires that Aristotle hold nature and goodness apart, so that the latter can serve as a standard for evaluating the former. He holds that nature does not treat all human beings alike: just as some are handicapped in their development by a deficiency in their natural abilities or propensities, others are extraordinarily fortunate and have so powerful a disposition to act well that they easily acquire good habits and skills of practical reasoning. Further, he recognizes that sociable inclinations and natural virtues have to compete in the human soul with other natural forces that make ethical life extraordinarily difficult. That is why things so often go so badly for us: we need not only to subdue the external environment, but to overcome certain inner natural obstacles as well. Even so, for Aristotle ethical life is not generally alienated from nature, as it is for other philosophers. Footnotesa I am grateful to David Keyt and Fred Miller, and to the other contributors to this volume, for their helpful comments on the previous draft of this paper. (shrink)

Aristotle's Politics is widely recognized as one of the classics of the history of political philosophy, and like every other such masterpiece, it is a work about which there is deep division.

My aim is to show how Aristotle's theory of friendship supports his thesis that happiness requires virtuous activity. Ethical behavior is valuable, according to the Nicomachean Ethics, not solely because it uses reason (the immoral can use reason too), but also because it is the expression of a loving attitude towards other persons. By emphasizing this aspect of virtuous activity, I defend Aristotle against the charge that his high estimation for pure intellectual activity commits him to an unethical (...) doctrine. I also argue that his theory of love helps explain why he considers the political life second only to the philosophical life. (shrink)

Plato puts goodness at the center of all practical thinking but offers no definition of it and implies that philosophy must find one. Aristotle demurs, arguing that there is no such thing as universal goodness. What we need, instead, is an understanding of the human good. Plato and Aristotle are alike in the attention they give to the category of the beneficial, and they agree that since some things are beneficial only as means, there must be others that (...) are non-derivatively beneficial. When G. E. Moore proposed in the early twentieth century that goodness is, as Plato had said, the foundation of ethics, he rejected not only the assumption that goodness needs a definition, but also that goodness is beneficial – that is, good for someone. This article traces the development of this debate as it plays out in the writings of Prichard, Ross, Geach, Thomson, and Scanlon. (shrink)

The Morality of Happiness is a marvelous book, one that I read with excitement and admiration for the author’s command over her subject and the philosophical richness of her ideas. It is an examination of some of the leading themes of ancient ethics: happiness, virtue, nature, and the proper relation between self and others. Annas does not try to present a comprehensive treatment of the whole of classical moral philosophy, since Socrates, Plato, and Plotinus are left aside. It is (...) class='Hi'>Aristotle and the Stoics who receive most emphasis, although the Epicureans and the Skeptics also play an important role in her discussion. In spite of these self-imposed limitations, this is a work of extremely wide scope; I don’t know of any other from which a reader can learn so much about ancient moral theory. And it is also an important contribution in its own right to moral philosophy, because it always discusses ancient material with a view to its implications for the ways in which ethics has been transformed in the modern period and is practiced today. Annas is at pains to deny that ancient ethics suffers in comparison with modern moral philosophy; on the contrary, she finds contemporary ethical thought to be barren and out of touch with what people care about. The ancient ethical theories—particularly those of Aristotle and the Stoics—are ones she thinks we can profitably use to remedy this situation. (shrink)